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IS GRIT IRRATIONAL FOR AKRATIC AGENTS? 
1. Introduction 
Contemporary analytic philosophers tend to see akrasia, or acting against one’s better judgement, 
as a problem of motivation. On this standard view, akratic actions are paradoxical since akratic 
agents know that they have a better alternative but nevertheless take up the worse, akratic option. 
In other words, akratic agents know what they are doing. They do not make any epistemic mistakes 
but – inexplicably – engage in behaviours that they correctly identify as wrong. The thought that 
akratic agents are not flawed as inquirers and knowers but only as agents plays a key role in turning 
akrasia into a textbook example of motivational only, or practical irrationality. 
This paper will aim to revise the standard view by emphasizing the epistemic dimensions of 
phenomenon, that is, the ways in which akrasia affects both how agents understand their own 
involvement and how they handle evidence about their prospects of success. The ambition is to 
show that akratic agents typically rationalise their akrasia. They do not recognise it as paradoxical 
or irrational. Instead, they reinterpret it as separate goal-directed actions undertaken under 
conditions that are not ideal for them. This rationalisation of akrasia is closely related to another 
epistemically deficient habit: akratic agents pay too much heed to evidence that they are unlikely 
to succeed. In so doing, they display too little of what philosophers have described as ‘epistemic 
resilience’, or more simply, ‘grit’.  
This result is significant for a number of reasons. First, it helps shed light on the relationship 
between the motivational and the epistemic sides of akrasia. Second, it offers a fuller understanding 
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of the phenomenon as a multi-faced process that unfolds over time rather than a sequence of 
paradoxical actions. Third, it avoids issuing of conflicting normative requirements toward agents 
who, like the akratic, already find themselves in an irrational state.  
The discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I consider a recent Evidential Threshold Account 
of grit, an epistemic attitude that allows agents to bracket out some unsettling evidence about their 
own chances of success. On this account, grit is rationally permitted only when agents operate in 
favourable or neutral circumstances. I then demonstrate how this account applies to akratic agents 
by outlining three clinical case vignettes (Section 3). In light of these vignettes, akrasia appears to 
be a particularly unfavourable circumstance, to the point of making grit no longer rational, if the 
Evidential Threshold Account is correct. In Section 4, I introduce my own philosophical account 
of akrasia as necessarily less-than-successful conduct, a mode of action that avoids straight failure 
but is never fully successful. I then expand on this idea to show how the epistemically deficient 
habit of rationalising one’s own akrasia leads to motivational perseverance of the wrong kind 
(Section 5). In Section 6, I contrast and compare my view of akrasia as a long-term process where 
the akratic conflict remains out of focus for the affected agents with the standard view which 
insists instead on their full awareness of conflict at the time of action. I argue that the alternative 
I propose can offer a clearer picture of why akrasia is a case of irrationality, both practical and 
epistemic, rather than a concealed form of rationality or a sub-personal kind of agency, beyond 
the scope of rational assessment. In the final Section 7, I return to the question how unsettling 
evidence is handled in the context of akrasia. I show that a requirement to refrain from grit would 
lead akratic agents into further irrationality rather than help them get out of their irrational state.  
 
2. The Evidential Threshold Account of Grit 
This section will critically explore a recent account of grit put forward in Morton and Paul (2019). 
On this account, grit is an epistemic attitude of resilience toward evidence that we are not likely to 
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succeed in projects of ours where we have already invested a lot. The authors highlight the 
motivational significance of remaining confident in one’s own success, especially when faced with 
difficulties. In other words, it would not be practically rational for agents who have worked toward 
a challenging long-term objective to give up at the first sign of difficulty. Grit provides such 
committed agents with an epistemic buffer – they are rationally permitted to set aside unsettling, 
or contrary evidence about their own prospects of success. This permission, however, is limited. 
Once their evidence that success is unlikely becomes clear, even committed agents are no longer 
rationally permitted to resist or downplay it. So, the room for rational grit lies between two 
epistemic extremes. On the one extreme, an agent places too much weight on contrary evidence, 
thus compromising her own chances of success by giving up too readily on more demanding, 
longer-term projects. On the other extreme, however, she pays too little heed to contrary evidence 
and perseveres in tasks long after her efforts have proven fruitless, thus also undermining her 
chances of succeeding at some alternative undertaking. Rational grit therefore excludes instances 
of excessive epistemic resilience where ‘we must rely on tactics like avoiding or ignoring the 
evidence, or nurturing positive illusions about our abilities or the extent of our control’ (2019: 
183).  
To distinguish between the two, Morton and Paul develop their Evidential Threshold Account. It tells 
us that there is a range of rationally permissible ways, or policies of treating contrary evidence once 
an agent commits to a project. This range varies from the policies available to either an 
independent observer faced with the same evidence or that same agent before her committing. In 
either of these two cases the evidential threshold required will be lower than that for a committed 
agent. That is to say, both an observer and an agent who contemplates a particular project should 
draw negative conclusions about the prospects of this project on grounds that might not be 
sufficient for a committed agent. Such an agent would be permitted to suspend judgement as long 
as her rationale does not involve any of the tactics listed earlier and, more generally, stirs away 
from what Morton and Paul (2019: 194) term ‘delusional optimism’. Importantly, the higher 
4 
 
evidential threshold to which committed agents are entitled is ‘ecologically constrained’: to remain 
epistemically rational, these agents should consider not only the content of the contrary evidence 
available to them. They should also factor in the overall context in which they operate. This context 
is agent-specific: what would look like neutral, if not favourable, circumstance for some agents 
would amount to stark adversity for other agents. Morton and Paul (2019: 200) refer to the vast 
array of precarious circumstances that would impact on the evidential threshold for committed 
agents as ‘resource scarcity’. This may include poverty or other forms of socioeconomic 
disadvantage but also traumatic personal experiences or lack of emotional support. Since the 
evidential threshold of committed agents should be responsive not only to data about their chances 
of success but also to the context in which these data are to be interpreted, commitment under 
extreme resource scarcity might not provide greater leeway with respect to contrary evidence. This 
is the crux of Morton and Paul’s argument: once we recognise that evidence is not just content, 
but content in context, rational grit turns out to be out of reach for agents who apparently need it 
most. The point is made as follows:  
… it may be that in situations of extreme scarcity agents should have reasoning habits that lead 
them to remain maximally sensitive to evidence of potential failure even after adopting a difficult 
goal. Put simply, perseverance may not serve such agents well. One reason is that such 
environments tend to be more unpredictable, and so the agent’s initial assessment of the likelihood 
of success might be less robustly justified. Another is that for an agent with scarce resources, events 
that would constitute small setbacks for someone else might be devastating … Given the high 
stakes of failure, retaining low evidential threshold may be more rational than the alternative… For 
agents who regularly operate in unsupportive or even discriminatory contexts… grit can lead to 
the investment of more effort than is effective or healthy. Consequently, it may be that agents in 
contexts of severe material and emotional scarcity ought not to have an evidential policy that 
enables grit at the expense of caution or self-protectiveness… they should remain highly responsive 
to evidence that pure effort will not be enough. (Morton and Paul 2019: 201-2) 
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The authors admit that this result is ‘distressing’. The reasoning habits that would amount to 
rational grit under more favourable conditions do not support the achievement of agents operating 
under resource scarcity but lead to their ‘over-efforting’ instead. As a consequence, the limited 
resources they have at their disposal are further depleted, in vain.  
Morton and Paul (2019) illustrate the link between misplaced grit and over-efforting with patterns 
of underachievement that affect students from underrepresented groups at elite universities. 
Unlike their peers from more privileged backgrounds, when faced with good predictive evidence 
that they are unlikely to complete a competitive course, many of these students do not opt for an 
alternative that would allow them to satisfy equivalent academic requirements but keep struggling 
with the original course. As a result, they end up failing their degree. 
Following Steele (2010) where this example comes from, Morton and Paul explain this instance of 
over-efforting as a counterproductive response to ‘stereotype threat’. The term was first 
introduced in Steele and Aronson (1995). It refers to feeling at risk of confirming, as a self-
characteristic, a negative stereotype about one’s social group or identity. For instance, in the social 
psychology experiments conducted and analysed by Steele and Aronson, Black undergraduate 
students performed worse than their White peers on standardised tests but only when race was 
made salient in advance of the task. When race was not made salient in this way, Black students 
performed better than or just as well as White students. The hypothesis put forward by Steele and 
Aronson is that performance in academic contexts can be impeded by awareness of how one’s 
conduct might be perceived through the lens of identity stereotypes: hence, the term ‘stereotype 
threat’.  Returning to the example discussed in Morton and Paul (2019), students from 
underprivileged backgrounds display excessive grit out of fear that by taking the easy way out they 
would effectively confirm the negative stereotype according to which people like them are not 
academically strong.    
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The present discussion will focus on a different set of cases altogether. Agents of interest to us 
would satisfy the conditions of extreme resource scarcity as defined by Morton and Paul. In 
addition to lack of emotional support and sometimes material deprivation, this scarcity would 
however also derive – partly but importantly – from their own records as agents. The feature that 
these agents have in common is that some exercises of their agency have been affected by a distinct 
form of akrasia, of which addiction is an example. Drawing on the Evidential Threshold Account 
we just explored, we should expect that grit cannot be rational for such agents. For even without 
notable scarcity in terms of external resources, akratic agents are subject to extreme scarcity in terms of internal 
resources: poor past performances linked to akrasia cast a shadow over any future commitments of 
theirs. Yet, there are strong reasons to doubt that grit may not be rational for them. To see what 
these reasons might be, let us first lay out three fictional case vignettes where agents with addiction 
try to pursue but ultimately fail at difficult, long-term projects in spite of sincere commitment. I 
shall then articulate what makes these cases illuminating for akratic agency overall. Expanding on 
this analysis, I shall return to the question of rational grit to argue pace Morton and Paul (2019) that 
greater resilience to contrary evidence is not only rationally permitted but also required in instances 
of extreme resource scarcity, such as akrasia.  
3. Three Cases of Akrasia  
The following vignettes are adapted from Radoilska and Fletcher (2016). Although fictional, they 
are informed by Fletcher’s four-decade-long clinical practice as NHS consultant psychiatrist. Italics 
will be used to emphasise elements of particular relevance to the underlying question whether grit 
is rational for akratic agents. 
Vignette 1: Mr Miller 
Mr Robert Miller is a 65-year-old retired Chief Executive. His mother died at the age of 82 from ‘old 
age’. His father died at the age of 58 from carcinoma of the oesophagus having been a heavy drinker 
throughout his adult life. Mr Miller was an only child and described a happy and stable childhood despite 
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his father’s drinking. He excelled at school, enjoyed good peer relationships and obtained a first-class honours 
degree at University. He married in his late 20s, had two children in his 30s, and in his mid-40s became 
the Chief Executive of a national company. He is described by his family as a good husband and father, with 
a reputation for honesty, integrity and fairness. Throughout his working life he drank alcohol most days, attributing 
this to the stress of his job and frequent socialising. In his early 60s he developed a tremor of his hands in the morning 
which he thought was anxiety. His wife and children became increasingly concerned about his drinking, especially 
as he was known on occasions to drink and drive. Under considerable family pressure he saw his GP and was 
referred for CBT to treat anxiety, stress and depression. He attended these sessions regularly but did not find 
them helpful and his drinking pattern did not change. Following a blood test to check thyroid function his 
GP detected markedly deranged liver function tests and referred him to a Consultant Psychiatrist 
who diagnosed moderate alcohol dependence. Mr Miller declined the offer of medication, believing that he was strong-
willed enough to reduce his drinking on his own, but he did accept two counselling sessions with a 
substance misuse liaison worker.  
When he was 64 years old, he arrived home one evening after drinking and fell out of his car in a very 
intoxicated state. An ambulance was called, and Mr Miller was taken to the A&E department. He was 
‘terrified’ that he would be reported to the Police for driving under the influence of alcohol, but this did 
not occur. The shock and embarrassment of this episode led him to accept treatment advice from his 
Consultant Psychiatrist, who arranged for a home detoxification followed by treatment with 
acamprosate 666mgs t.d.s., and disulfiram 200mgs daily which his wife promised to supervise ‘religiously’. 
For 6 months prior to his retirement Mr Miller complied with treatment. His wife, however, gave up 
supervising disulfiram after 3 months as she had started to ‘trust’ her husband again. His mood was buoyant, 
his work performance strong and he looked physically fit, having lost weight. Against the advice of his Consultant 
Psychiatrist Mr Miller stopped taking medication one month prior to retirement so that he could ‘enjoy’ his 
farewell party. This is because, when mixed with alcohol, disulfiram produces strong 
uncomfortable feelings similar to hangover almost immediately after consumption.  
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Mr Miller was convinced that there would be no problems with alcohol after retirement in view of his clinical progress 
and the future stress-free lifestyle he anticipated. He drank at his retirement party, relapsed back into uncontrolled 
heavy drinking and spent his early retirement days feeling depressed, deeply ashamed and bored. His very caring 
family were desperate for him to stop drinking and asked his Psychiatrist if he could be ‘sectioned’. After 
some persuasion Mr Miller had another home detoxification and restarted treatment with 
acamprosate and supervised disulfiram. He drank on top of his medication and started to talk about ‘checking 
out’, by which he meant committing suicide. 
Vignette 2: Amy Parker 
Amy Parker is a 21-year-old mother of one child. She never knew her biological father. Her mother had 
multiple boyfriends who often brought alcohol and drugs into the home. As a young girl she was given 
alcohol and was sexually abused by a number of her mother’s temporary partners. Her educational performance was 
poor, and she socialised with a group of students on the fringe of school life. At the age of 11 she started smoking 
cigarettes and as a 13-year-old she self-harmed by scratching the inside of her thighs with scissors, but 
this behaviour never came to the attention of her teachers or GP. By the age of 15 she had used a wide 
range of ‘party’ drugs. Social Services were temporarily involved when Amy was found living on the streets 
having stopped going to school. At the age of 17 she smoked heroin and within 3 months was injecting into her 
arms and hands. Amy also used street diazepam, cheap alcohol and occasionally shared a pipe of 
crack cocaine. When she was 18-years old, she developed a left-sided deep vein thrombosis after 
injecting into her groin and was found to be hepatitis C positive. She became pregnant at the age of 19 and 
this led to a remarkable change in her behaviour. Amy began to attend a Community Substance Misuse 
Team (CSMT) where she was started on a methadone prescription. Her medication was supervised on 
a daily basis at a local supermarket pharmacy and the dose was gradually increased to 120 mls 
methadone mixture 1mg/ml. This, together with the support of a substance misuse worker, 
appeared to help her stop using heroin and diazepam. A number of consecutive urine and swab 
tests were negative for illicit drugs. In view of being hepatitis C positive Amy was offered 
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appointments at her local hospital antenatal department which she attended regularly. Towards the 
end of the second trimester she returned to live with her mother. Amy said that she was determined to give her baby 
the ‘best possible chance’ and was ‘desperate’ to be a good mother and to care for her child well. Throughout her 
pregnancy Amy received close support from a Community Midwife, Social Services and the 
CSMT. By the third trimester she was considered to have made excellent progress. In view of this, and 
continuing regular negative tests for illicit drugs, the pick-up regime of methadone was reduced to 
twice weekly. A small-for-dates baby boy was born in good health (apart from a squint) at 38 weeks 
gestation by spontaneous vaginal delivery. Amy experienced a short period of baby blues and did 
not take to breast feeding. Even with close support she found the routine of caring for her baby demanding and 
exasperating. Within two months of the birth Amy was no longer picking up her methadone on a regular basis and 
she began to make excuses for failing to attend her key worker appointments at the CSMT. When she did 
attend, she said she was exhausted. A drug screen taken at 12 weeks post-delivery tested positive for heroin, 
cocaine and diazepam. Conflict with her mother accelerated when Amy started going out in the 
evenings leaving the baby in her mother’s care. Her mother told the CSMT that Amy was ‘seeing’ drug 
users and dealers she had relationships with in the past. Despite strenuous efforts and serious 
warnings from the CSMT, a Health Visitor and Social Workers from the Child Protection Team, 
Amy returned to her old pattern of injecting drug use and unstable relationships. Despite Amy’s promises of 
improvement and pleas for clemency her son was eventually removed from her care and put up for adoption. 
Vignette 3: Peter Phillips 
Peter Phillips is a 27-year-old, ex-Army Corporal with no family history of psychiatric disorder. He was an 
average student, sporty, popular and outgoing. After leaving school he joined the British Army and 
excelled during basic training. He loved Army life, enjoying the hard work, discipline and camaraderie. At 
weekends he would drink heavily with his friends, but this did not seem to impact on his work performance. His 
military Unit was closely knit, especially after their first tour of duty in Afghanistan. Whilst leading 
a night patrol during a second tour in Afghanistan, the soldier behind him stepped on a landmine. Peter 
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was spattered with blood and shrapnel fragments but was able to continue. The patrol came under 
heavy fire and the men ran for cover. Peter found himself in an irrigation channel with two friends. 
Whilst they attempted to provide covering fire Peter showed great bravery (later formally recognised), 
running back to the wounded soldier and dragging him 20 metres into the ditch. Attempts were made to 
provide first aid, with tourniquets being applied to both leg stumps, but despite their best efforts 
the soldier died. Following this Peter said that his nerves were ‘shredded’. He felt constantly in danger, irritable, 
aggressive and guilty. After the tour in Afghanistan was over the Unit was sent to Cyprus for R&R. 
Peter got drunk every day, was argumentative and started getting into fights. Back in the UK he lost interest in 
Army life and continued to drink heavily. He made the decision to apply for premature voluntary retirement. 
His Unit Medical Officer referred him to a CPN at the military Department of Community Mental 
Health. The CPN thought that Peter had Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) so provided an 
abbreviated form of trauma-focussed CBT and suggested to the Unit Medical Officer that a prescription of 
mirtazapine, 30mgs at night, might help. The treatment proved beneficial. Peter subsequently left the Army 
but found it difficult to obtain work. He continued to suffer intermittent nightmares of the incident in 
Afghanistan and drank half a bottle of vodka most nights as he was ‘frightened to go to sleep’. He was unable 
to maintain a stable relationship with a girlfriend and due to continuing unemployment, he came under 
financial pressure. His previous symptoms of PTSD returned ‘with a vengeance’. His drinking spiralled out of 
control, he wet the bed regularly and suffered a bad bout of pancreatitis after which his GP told him to 
‘completely and permanently abstain from alcohol’. However, Peter considered that using alcohol was the only way 
he could get to sleep and suppress the vivid memories, sense of danger, jumpiness and anxiety he experienced. 
Peter was arrested after attacking a stranger in a pub who criticised the Army and he ended up on a 
Probation Order. His Probation Officer arranged for referral to Psychological Services but, after 
waiting 4 months for an assessment, Peter was told that nothing could be done for him until he stopped drinking. 
Following referral to a Community Substance Misuse Team he received an in-patient detoxification 
during which he was re-referred to Psychological Services. Peter continuing to have nightmares of 
Afghanistan, feelings of anger and aggression, and panic attacks. He kept away from all reminders of 
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military life and avoided watching TV news programmes. Within two weeks of leaving the detoxification unit he 
started to drink a bottle of vodka a day. He was again turned away from Psychological Services because of his 
alcohol consumption. Peter has managed to get a job as a Car Park attendant but is still drinking very heavily 
and suffering from PTSD. He says he ‘hates the taste’ of alcohol and wants to stop drinking, but he fears he might 
kill himself as he cannot cope with his nightmares, loneliness and sense of guilt. 
4. Akrasia as necessarily less-than-successful conduct 
As shown by the vignettes, none of the agents succeeds in their respective endeavours. For 
instance, Mr Miller (Vignette 1) ignores his ‘drink problem’, then tries to solve it by himself – 
unsuccessfully, looks for professional help, gets on the way to recovery, relapses, and ultimately, 
gives up trying. The pattern of good initial progress followed by relapse and despair is also 
replicated in Vignettes 2 and 3. This section will aim to shed light on lack of success as distinctive 
feature of the exercises of agency illustrated in all three cases, exercises that we may qualify as 
akratic. To do so, I will expand on the account of akrasia as necessarily less-than-successful conduct that 
could manifest itself in patterns of either weakness of will or addiction  I proposed in Radoilska (2013). In 
essence, the central feature we encounter across these closely related phenomena is understood as 
follows.  
First, being necessarily less-than-successful qualifies a conduct or a particular strand of a person’s 
agency, for instance excessive use of alcohol and related behaviours like drinking in secret from 
family rather than this person’s agency overall. Second, being necessarily less-than-successful 
points to a distinctive kind of agency, the manifestations of which cannot be fully successful to the 
extent that they arise at all. They avoid straight failure; yet they do not qualify as achievements. In 
this sense, akrasia can be aptly defined as perseverance of the wrong kind. What is missing here is the 
openness to both success and failure that comes with engaging in a new project. So even if akratic 
conduct cannot be successful, it still provides a degree of certainty in getting at least something 
that is not readily available to agents.i This certainty is akin to the sense of familiarity or feeling at 
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home afforded by some habitual behaviours (cf. Carlisle 2014). Having said that, it is important to 
note that if akrasia is a habit, it is neither unthinking, nor ‘out of control’, but a distinctive mode of perceiving, 
interpreting, feeling, reasoning and doing that results in necessarily less-than-successful conduct.ii The 
reason for this becomes apparent when we take seriously ‘achievement’ as unifying idea that 
underpins all credible manifestations of agency (cf. Bradford 2015). Any action in this broad sense 
is meant to be a kind of achievement, at least on its own terms. Agential success here is defined across 
two complementary axes: not only production (bringing about an effect), but also assertion (an agent’s 
articulating a particular commitment of theirs). Only when these two axes are well-aligned is an 
action successful on its own terms. Such an action would amount to actualisation on the part of the 
agent: her effecting a change in the world articulates a commitment of hers. By contrast, when 
production and assertion are misaligned in a distinctive and sustained way, rather than just coming 
apart, the ensuing actions are necessarily less-than-successful. The misalignment defining akrasia 
takes the following form: the relevant conduct is successful as production to the extent that it is unsuccessful as 
assertion. Following on from this account, addiction looks like a recalcitrant and particularly frustrating 
form of secondary akrasia that derives from a considerable difficulty, if not subjective inability to 
address an initial conflict between valuing (the assertive dimension of agential success) and intending 
(the productive dimension of agential success).  
Returning to Case Vignette 1 for illustration, when Mr Miller goes off his medication to enjoy his 
retirement party, what he does is successful in terms of production (he drinks alcohol at the party) 
to the extent that it is also unsuccessful in terms of assertion (it undermines his sincere 
commitment to a life free from alcohol). Importantly, the underlying conflict between assertion 
and production, valuing and intending is not immediately apparent to an akratic agent. Although 
neither complete, nor present in every instance of addictive conduct, this lack of self-awareness is 
significant. It brings together two prominent features in the phenomenology of secondary akrasia 
which are also present in our three Case Vignettes: frustration at one’s own actions coupled with a sense of 
hopelessness for the future. These features point to an underlying conflict between assertion and 
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production that stays out of focus and, instead of being addressed, keeps coming back to eventually 
solidify into necessarily less-than-successful conduct. The ensuing sense of under-achievement 
often serves as inducement to further necessarily less-than-successful exercises of one’s agency. 
As pointed out earlier, albeit it frustrating, this conduct comes with a reliable outcome. This might 
not be what akratic agents appreciate or even want. It is nevertheless something that they can cling 
on to. Recall Case Vignette 3: Peter hates the taste of alcohol and wants to stop drinking even 
though he never spends a day of abstinence outside of the clinic.  
5. Akratic self-awareness and rationalisation 
At first blush, it might seem paradoxical that frustration at one’s own actions does not offer a 
platform for the realignment of actual plans to sincere commitments. On closer look, however, it 
becomes clear that experiences such as these feed back into the lack of self-awareness that typically 
accompanies necessarily less-than-successful conduct. For they help mask the underlying conflict 
between its assertive and productive dimensions. The latter are seemingly broken down into 
separate one-dimensional actions whose outcomes would not strike us as mutually exclusive. This kind 
of redescription defines the retirement party planning by Mr Miller: the party is treated as a one-
off occasion, which in one sense it clearly is. This, however, does not apply to drinking alcohol, 
which in Mr Miller’s case has been a near daily routine for decades. By failing to appreciate that 
drinking alcohol at his retirement party is an instance of the same necessarily less-than-successful 
conduct that he is trying to overcome, Mr Miller makes further instances such as this more likely 
to occur. And as we learn from the vignette, the relapse indeed leads to a sense of shame and 
hopelessness that in turn underwrite further necessarily less-than-successful actions of his. 
In fact, we can already see at the start of Case Vignette 1 how akrasia gets reinterpreted as separate 
actions that belie the underlying process. Mr Miller accounts for his regular alcohol consumption 
as goal-directed response to specific events in his professional life, such as frequent socialising 
with business partners. Following this line of thought, he does not anticipate drinking alcohol after 
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his retirement. This partly explains his unpreparedness to address the recurring episodes of alcohol 
consumption during the first months of his retirement. For, on the goal-directed, action-by-action 
redescription Mr Miller was giving to his drinking, these episodes would not happen once the 
rationale for consuming alcohol – keeping up with professional obligations – no longer applied to 
him. What transpires at this point is that necessarily less-than-successful conduct is undergirded 
by a stable, self-fulfilling mechanism that makes alternative approaches to agential achievement, to 
which success and failure are equally open, far riskier and less attractive as a result. 
Recent work on rationalisation shows that relevantly similar mechanisms might be at work more 
widely, maintaining less-than-successful exercises of individual agency that would not qualify as 
akratic in the strict sense. As Schwitzgebel and Ellis (2017: 170) point out:  
Rationalisation occurs when a person favours a particular conclusion as a result of some factor 
(such as self-interest) that is of little justificatory epistemic relevance. The thinker then seeks an 
adequate justification for that conclusion but the very factor responsible for her favouring it now 
biases how the research for justification unfolds. As a result of an epistemically illegitimate 
investigation, the person identifies and endorses a justification that makes no mention of the 
distorting factor that has helped guide her search. 
There is a potential dissonance here between three categories of reasons: 1) actual motivating reasons 
that the process of rationalisation keeps out of focus; 2) explanatory reasons that make this process 
intelligible on reflection; and 3) justificatory reasons that the agent appropriates post factum (cf. 
Alvarez 2013) . On this picture of reasons for belief and action, rationalisation would be especially 
pernicious when it papers over not just some dissonance but straight contradiction between 
different categories of reasons. The upshot is to make detection and eventual resolution extremely 
unlikely. As Schwitzgebel and Ellis (2017: 171) observe, rationalisation not only ‘obstructs the 
critical evaluation of one’s own reasoning’; in addition, ‘it impedes the productive exchange of 
reasons and ideas among well-meaning interlocutors’.  
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Being necessarily less-than-successful, akratic conduct rests on this kind of more pernicious 
rationalisation that obscures akratic agents’ self-understanding as conflicted and precludes their 
effective communication with meaningful others. As illustrated by Case Vignette 1, these two 
trends go hand in hand. By rationalising his daily alcohol consumption as an efficient and context-
dependent means to secure professional goals, Mr Miller blocks the realisation that this routine 
clearly jeopardises important commitments of his. This rationalisation succeeds in reducing the 
visibility of the conflict between assertion and production, valuing and intending from the first-
person perspective of the akratic agent himself. This ambivalent success, however, is achieved at 
the expense of a related failure: Mr Miller must remain at odds with his family and keep ignoring, 
for as long as possible, that he has a problem with alcohol.  
The proposed analysis explains why the action-by-action redescription of one’s own akratic 
conduct paints akratic actions as either fully successful (e.g. Mr Miller’s take on his drinking before 
the A&E episode) or clear failures (e.g. Mr Miller’s view on his continuing to drink after 
retirement). For redescriptions such as these require that success in action is interpreted as one-
dimensional and dependent on a single question, on this occasion, that of whether the intended 
outcome is achieved or not. 
Importantly, even if the implicit notion of agential success at work here is scalar to allow for 
degrees of achievement rather than binary, this additional nuance would not be enough to 
transcend the limitations of the one-dimensional model on which success in action is assessed. As 
a consequence, akratic incentives are not identified as subclass of a distinctive category of reasons, 
explanatory ones. Explanatory reasons, also known as ‘reasons why’ (cf. Dancy 2000) lead to action 
without necessarily motivating it in a way that is transparent to the agent. For instance, I might 
stay at home instead of joining a party because I forgot about it or because I find social interactions 
too demanding. In each of these cases, the reason which explains my staying at home is not a reason, 
in the light of which I act. This is fairly obvious in the first scenario, where I simply forget about the 
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party. By contrast, in the second scenario, I might be tempted to rationalise my staying at home 
by pointing to a good (normative) reason I could have had for doing so, such as needing to rest or 
to complete a piece of work with a pressing deadline. The problem with this rationalisation of 
mine is that it misdescribes what I do by misrepresenting my motives. This reason-swapping also 
undermines my self-understanding as an agent: I can keep engaging in less-than-successful conduct, such 
as avoiding parties without realising that this is what I am effectively doing.  
In a similar vein, the failure to recognise akratic incentives as fundamentally explanatory rather 
than either motivating or normative reasons is part of the underlying mechanism that obfuscates 
the necessary correlation between successful production and unsuccessful assertion in akrasia. 
One-dimensional models of action, whether attuned to a binary or a scalar notion of success, do 
not offer a corrective. Instead, they inadvertently reinforce the pernicious rationalisation that fuels 
akrasia.iii 
6. Acting against one’s better judgment as puzzle of practical irrationality 
Before returning to grit and its putative irrationality for akratic agents, there are two related 
questions we need to consider. First, how does the account of akrasia employed in the preceding 
vignette analysis relate to the standard account, according to which akrasia consists in acting against 
one’s better judgement at the time of action? And second, why rely on this alternative account rather than 
the standard one when addressing the issue of whether grit is irrational for akratic agents? 
The standard account of akrasia introduced in Davidson (1970/2001) and further developed in 
Mele (1987), focusses on discrete, self-contained actions that take place in a short space of time, 
such as the following:iv 
One Drink Too Many 
Alex has an important presentation to make next day early in the morning. Before heading back 
home after work, her colleagues invite her to join them for a drink. She decides to go out but have 
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no more than two drinks as she knows that drinking any more will affect the quality of her 
performance next morning. As the evening progresses, she is offered a third drink, which, after a 
brief moment of hesitation, she takes. Against her better judgment, she ends up having a fourth 
drink as well. 
The akratic conflict here is meant to be stark. The action goes against the agent’s own better 
judgment. It is also free and uncompelled. And, since it all happens at the same time, it bears the 
hallmarks of an enacted head-on contradiction that singles out akrasia as paradigm case of practical 
irrationality. 
This is a neat, theoretically attractive picture. Yet, part of its appeal derives from leaving the 
phenomena under consideration fundamentally under-described. It is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion to offer a sustained argument in support of this claim.v Instead, I shall briefly 
outline the advantages of filling in the standard account in the way proposed earlier. One of these 
advantages derives from conceiving akrasia as a process that unfolds over time rather than a series of one-off 
events. This is not to say that acting against one’s better judgment never takes the form suggested 
by scenarios, such as One Drink Too Many. The interest of a diachronic interpretation is instead to 
indicate that on many occasions the akratic conflict is not immediately apparent and can be seen 
for what it is only if a longer-term view on exercises of agency is adopted. As shown by the 
vignettes we considered, first-personal rationalisations of the akratic process contribute to an 
action-by-action redescription, where the underling conflict is diffused: the akratic agent seems to 
be doing first one thing for a good reason and then, at a later time, another, very different thing, 
for a good reason also. All of these instances of akrasia are likely to slip under the radar on the 
synchronic understanding implied by the standard account. For cases, such as One Drink Too Many 
are only the tip of the iceberg. By focussing on them as central, we are likely to lose sight of how 
different facets of akratic conduct fit together and why this amounts to practical irrationality.  
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Addressing this issue is another, related advantage of conceiving akrasia in terms of necessarily 
less-than-successful conduct. It helps solve a fundamental puzzle put forward by Davidson (2001): 
practical irrationality is difficult to pin down. If we explain its instances too readily, we turn it into 
a concealed type of rationality. If, by contrast, we treat these instances as ultimately unintelligible, 
we reallocate them to the domain of non-rationality or sub-personal agency. We observed a 
relevantly similar tension in Case Vignette 1. Mr Miller’s early rationalisation of his akratic conduct 
presents it as fully rational albeit unorthodox goal-directed behaviour. By contrast, his family’s 
request to have him sectioned as well as his own later despair at failing to stop drinking relegate a 
cluster of his agency to something regrettable that is merely happening to him. In either case, a 
central feature of akrasia is missed out: the conduct to which it gives rise is criticisable in virtue of being 
irrational by the akratic agent’s own lights. Scenarios like One Drink Too Many are good at highlighting 
the puzzle; however, this is achieved at the expense of simplifying it. The synchronic approach to 
akrasia is only part of the problem. For the notion of akratic conflict as head-on contradiction, on 
which this approach rests, also suggests that akrasia is fundamentally motivational an issue: the agent 
sees the better course of action and yet engages in an opposite and inferior one. As a consequence, 
the epistemic dimension of akrasia is left unattended. Yet, looking at the preceding vignettes, 
akratic agents’ knowledge of their own actions is compromised in a distinctive way. Moreover, this 
is a constitutive feature of the phenomenon rather than a by-product of it. Being able to account 
for the interactions between the motivational and the epistemic aspects of akrasia is crucial for 
understanding it as practical irrationality without over-emphasising its proximity to either 
rationality or non-rationality. Rethinking akrasia as necessarily less-than-successful conduct rather 
than merely an individual action undertaken against one’s own better judgment offers a promising 
ground for such an account.vi  
7. Grit and the akratic handling of evidence 
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Having explored a possible account of akrasia as necessarily less-than-successful conduct, in light 
of three case vignettes, we can now appreciate fully the challenge presented by the Evidential 
Threshold Account of grit outlined at the start of this paper. To recap, according to this Account, 
committed agents are rationally permitted to handle adverse evidence in a different way than 
impartial observers or even the same agents before committing. The difference consists in a higher 
threshold for treating such evidence as decisive in the case of committed agents. For, once they 
assess a long-term project of theirs as very unlikely to succeed in the light of newly acquired 
evidence, they have to give up, in spite of the time and effort they have already expended on it. By 
contrast, when faced with evidence that speaks against a particular undertaking, both observers 
and not yet committed agents only need to redirect their attention without incurring any loss. The 
distinction between committed and non-committed agents comes with an important caveat. The 
higher threshold provision concerning adverse evidence does not apply uniformly to all committed 
agents. Those operating under conditions of extreme resource scarcity are excluded from it. What 
rationality requires from them is to continue handling contrary evidence as non-committed agents 
or mere observers would.  
This modified requirement should also apply to akratic agents. As the preceding discussion shows, 
they fully satisfy the conditions of extreme resource scarcity set out by the Evidential Threshold 
Account. In many cases, of which Vignettes 2 and 3 are examples, this would include reduced 
external resources, such as unsupportive environment and financial strain. However, as Vignette 
1 illustrates, even in cases where akratic agents do not suffer from extreme external scarcity, they 
would still be subject to extreme internal scarcity generated by their own record of necessarily less-
than-successful conduct. And as we pointed out earlier, this conduct demonstrates perseverance 
of the wrong kind. So, it would seem natural to conclude that epistemic resilience would only 




In spite of its initial appeal, this possible conclusion is open to a challenge. Assuming a normative 
understanding of rationality, there should be a point to being rational. Things should go better for 
agents who heed what rationality requires, not worse. The underlying expectation covers not only 
what we might term steadily rational exercises of agency. It is even more to the point when agents have 
strayed away and are now trying to get back on track. As Broome (2007: 365) observes: ‘Just 
because you are in an irrational state, that does not mean rationality can be expected to impose 
conflicting requirements on you. You should expect rationality to require you to get out of your 
irrational state, not to get in deeper, into … further irrationality’.  
Turning to akratic agents, this normative expectation looks like the following: Just because they 
have a record of necessarily less-than-successful conduct, thus operating under (at least internal 
but probably also external) resource scarcity, that does not mean rationality can be expected to 
impose conflicting requirements upon them. They should expect rationality to require them to get 
out of their practically irrational state of akrasia, not to get in deeper, into further irrationality. 
The requirement to forgo grit, however, does seem to require akratic agents to get in deeper into 
further irrationality. As highlighted earlier, Morton and Paul (2019: 202) admit that grit’s 
unsuitability to the pursuit of difficult goals under extreme resource scarcity is a distressing finding. 
In light of the present discussion, this admission points to a normative conflict that the Evidential 
Threshold Account ultimately imposes on committed agents that meet with a lot of adversity. For 
it asks such agents to keep low evidential threshold when deciding whether to give up on 
demanding goals that their context has made even harder to achieve. Looking at instances of 
akrasia, this implicit contradiction cannot be adequately explained as a tension that results from 
the irrational state in which the affected agents find themselves, independently of this Account’s 
requirement on how they should handle contrary evidence. Instead, the contradiction is introduced 
by the requirement itself: As your evidence points out, you are in a desperate situation, so do not 
try to protect yourself from despair!  
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To see why grit is, after all, rational for akratic agents, let us look back at the overall shape relevant 
exercises of agency take across our three vignettes. In all cases, we witness the undertaking of a 
difficult long-term objective – overcoming one’s necessarily less-than-successful conduct that has 
become a clear threat either to specific core commitments (Vignettes 1 and 2) or to getting on with 
one’s life overall (Vignette 3). This undertaking, however, ends up uniformly in failure, in spite of 
some initial success. How is this shape of agency to be explained? Is it plausible to submit that 
things go wrong for the akratic agents because of excessive, viz. irrational grit?  
Such an explanation might seem supported by the impact rationalisation has on akratic agents’ 
self-awareness as conflicted agents. As argued earlier, such agents tend to redescribe their 
necessarily less-than-successful conduct in terms of self-standing actions aimed at particular 
outcomes. These redescriptions make the akratic conflict less conspicuous and more manageable 
from the agents’ own perspective. At the same time, however, they entrench akratic conduct 
further. For, the inverse correlation between unsuccessful assertion and successful production that 
underpins it does not come to the agents’ attention. Clearly, the akratic handling of evidence here 
is wanting. What is less clear is that the shortcoming results from inappropriate epistemic 
resilience. For there are no traces of delusional optimism in the vignettes. I take this observation 
to be self-evident regarding Vignettes 2 and 3: neither Amy, nor Peter overestimate their chances 
of success at any point. A strong case can also be made regarding Vignette 1: Mr Miller takes 
himself to be strong-willed enough to cut down on alcohol without medical help. With hindsight, 
his self-assessment is proven wrong; however, there is no reason to attribute this error to irrational 
grit: contrary evidence, such as frequent relapses has not yet become available. What is more, as a 
high-achiever, Mr Miller has a lot of evidence to support his self-belief.  
If undue epistemic resilience is not the source of trouble for these akratic agents, how are we then 
to account for their failures to achieve the goals to which they have committed? Here is a possible 
alternative: akratic agents tend to fail because of their handling of evidence; in particular, they keep 
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applying low threshold to contrary evidence after commitment, as the Evidential Threshold 
Account requires from them. As the following discussion will aim to demonstrate, this approach 
is epistemically irrational since it takes evidential content out of its original context; it is also 
practically irrational since it paints one’s own project as ineffectual trying and, as a result, promotes 
self-fulfilling despair. 
The agents in all three vignettes have a feature in common: They keep a close eye on their own 
less-than-successful performances, both past and present. These are treated not just as indicative 
evidence of how they are likely to perform in the future. In fact, this evidence is accorded high 
predictive value and treated as conclusive. This shared pattern of contrary evidence handling is 
apparent in the overwhelming effect that first significant setbacks have in Vignettes 1 and 2. Mr 
Miller reverts to uncontrolled heavy drinking once it becomes clear that his life after retirement 
will not be plain sailing. Amy resumes her use of illicit drugs soon after she discovers that looking 
after a baby is much harder than she anticipated. Vignette 3 is even more to the point. Peter never 
attempts to stop drinking outside of the clinic: as bad as it is, drinking has so far helped him resist 
the urge of committing suicide. Peter’s evidence handling is fully consistent with what the 
Evidential Threshold Account recommends for agents who, like him, operate under conditions of 
extreme resource scarcity. Yet, it amounts to sinking deeper into further irrationality rather than 
addressing the underlying akratic conflict.  
Following this line of thought, we can now clearly see why akratic rationalisations derive from 
giving too much credence to contrary evidence rather than ignoring or underestimating it. Peter 
redescribes his routine alcohol intake as a means to an end, a straightforward action as production, 
not a conflicted exercise of agency. Nevertheless, he acknowledges it as a means of last resort. But 
seeing oneself as someone with no alternatives can only support perseverance of the wrong kind, 
that of necessarily less-than-successful conduct.  
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It might be objected that, albeit distressing, Peter’s conclusion is not epistemically irrational: he is 
indeed in a bad way. His conclusion, however, goes further than this admittedly accurate 
assessment: there is no other way to keep going than drinking oneself unconscious. This over-
pessimistic account is the upshot of keeping one’s threshold for contrary evidence low when 
operating under conditions of extreme resource scarcity. For such a policy contributes to a pair of 
harmful (and irrational) reasoning habits. The first is to focus on evidence that is partial, 
inconclusive and context-sensitive in the wrong way. The second is to ignore one’s position as 
agent when assessing evidence relative to own actions. Let us explore each habit in turn. 
Keeping a close eye on evidence that one is unlikely to succeed has an obvious flipside: being less 
sensitive to evidence in one’s favour. For this low evidential threshold is not meant to be applied 
uniformly but to capture putative contrary evidence. As a consequence, supportive evidence is 
acknowledged as such at a higher threshold. Moreover, in all cases the agents are looking at 
probable future states of affairs, not facts. So, no matter how strong adverse evidence they 
encounter, this evidence is, by definition, inclusive. This point is unlikely to register with them as 
long as they stick to a low threshold for contrary evidence which of course abounds under 
conditions of extreme scarcity. 
The underlying reasoning habit also affects how evidence that registers is assessed. It is not 
calibrated to the task that akratic agents are effectively engaged in. To appreciate what the stakes 
are, let us briefly consider an example from the literature on skill. In an illuminating paper, Hawley 
(2003) sketches the following scenario: to escape from ruthless assailants, a person has to manage 
to drive away on a frozen lake, while under heavy fire. The question whether she can drive in these 
action-movie circumstances is categorically different from that whether she can drive tout court. 
It would be misleading to think of driving as one and the same task performed in different 
circumstances. For such an understanding is likely to lead us to underestimate the gap between 
standard of success in the extraordinary case as opposed to that in the ordinary one. For instance, 
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failure to perform well in the former is no evidence against this person’s likelihood to succeed in 
the latter.  
Returning to the issue of contrary evidence handling in the context of akrasia, there is a valuable 
lesson we can learn from the preceding thought experiment. Akratic agents treat the projects they 
have committed to as difficult only in the sense of their own poor prospects to succeed. In so 
doing, they end up assessing their performances as though failing at another, much easier (and 
irrelevant) task, such as refraining from alcohol when things go well, in the absence of alcohol 
dependence. In contrast, if what they are trying to achieve were to be considered in its original 
context, missteps would be judged less harshly and their predictive value, more readily questioned. 
Let us now move to the second and related reasoning habit, ignoring one’s position when handling 
evidence about the odds of being successful as an agent. There is something distinctly 
disempowering in thinking about one’s own commitments primarily as a matter to settle by 
weighing up evidence, like an impartial observer would. For unlike observers, agents have the 
power to influence the relevant course of events: they make things happen in virtue of their acting. 
So, when considering how projects of theirs might unfold, agents are not confined to the available 
evidence that speaks in favour of or against a happy end.vii To require them to inhabit such a 
detached perspective, on pain of irrationality, amounts to undoing their standing as agents. At the 
very least, it generates the conditions for split-up, if not conflicted exercises of agency. If I am 
trying to get something done while looking for signs that I would better give up, my trying cannot 
be wholehearted. And when the project that I am engaged in is difficult anyway, my keeping watch 
for contrary evidence is likely to turn what I am doing into just trying. But seeing myself trying and 
never succeeding is likely to push me toward more predictable undertakings.viii In this context, 
necessarily less-than-successful conduct could offer such an agent much-needed certainty. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
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In this paper, I argued that akrasia is best understood as necessarily less-than-successful conduct. 
Akratic actions are successful as productions to the extent that they are unsuccessful as assertions. 
By treating these actions as parts of a longer-term process of rationalisation instead of paradoxical 
one-off events, it becomes possible to investigate the epistemic side of the phenomenon along 
with its better researched motivational side. Reflecting on a series of case vignettes, I tested the 
initially plausible claim that grit or epistemic resilience might not be rational for akratic agents since 
– as a result of their akrasia – they should remain alert to contrary evidence that projects of theirs 
are unlikely to succeed. In the light of a normative understanding of rationality according to which 
being rational should benefit agents, it transpired, however, that refraining from grit would only 
make akratic agents worse off. This is because the rationalisations that underpin their necessarily 
less-than-successful conduct already overexpose them to contrary evidence. A requirement to stay 
focussed on such evidence when pursuing difficult goals can only amplify the disempowering 
effects of rationalisation.  
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i In this respect, there is superficial resemblance between akratic conduct and skilled agency, viz. secure 
competence. See, for instance, Raz (2012, p. 2012): ‘We acquire and are aware of having a sphere of secure 
competence, consisting of a range of actions that, in normal circumstances, we reliably expect that we shall 
successfully perform if we set out to perform them, barring competence-defeating events (which are very 
rare).’ For, the reliability that comes with akratic conduct is not that of success but that of not ending up 
with nothing. 
ii See Pollard (2010) for an account of habit as a complex disposition across various manifestations of 
agency. Douskos (2017) adds on an insightful contrast between such an understanding of habit and existing 
notions of skill. 
iii I speak of one-dimensional models in the plural as pernicious rationalisation of the kind described here 
may also be supported by an underlying understanding of action as assertion only rather than production as 




awareness as conflicted agent is grounded in her sense of whole-hearted commitment to be a good mother 
and to give her baby the best chance in life (normative-cum-motivating reason). Akratic incentives 
(explanatory reasons) are then dismissed as (normatively) insignificant, which in turn makes their enduring 
efficacy even more perplexing from the point of the akratic agent. And since Amy continues to operate 
with a one-dimensional model of action as assertion, she assumes that the issue lies with the very object of 
her commitment: looking after her baby is experienced as an exhausting and exasperating activity.  
iv The standard account of akrasia is sometimes presented as a theoretical offshoot from Ancient Greek 
treatments of the topic, in particular that by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7 (2001). Yet, the 
relationship is far more complex, with several points of contrast, for instance, unlike Ancient Greek 
discussions of akrasia, contemporary counterparts tend to see the issue as one of rationality rather than 
morality. Charles (1984) offers an illuminating analysis of Aristotle’s theory of action in comparison to that 
of Donald Davidson, which until recently dominated the contemporary debate. See also Hoffmann (2008) 
where major views on akrasia throughout the history of Western philosophy are critically explored in their 
original intellectual contexts. 
v See, however, Radoilska (2013).  
vi See Holton (2009) for an alternative diachronic conception of the phenomenon. Its irrationality is 
interpreted in terms of irresoluteness instead of perseverance of the wrong kind: akratic agents change their 
minds too readily. This conception helps solve some of the difficulties faced by the standard synchronic 
account. However, it still prioritises the motivational dimension of the phenomenon at the expense of its 
epistemic significance.  
vii See Radoilska (2017) for an argument in favour of treating beliefs about one’s own actions as a special 
case where the truth norm can be satisfied in two ways: not only by following the available evidence that 
something is or is not the case but also by making that something is or is not the case through the exercise 
of one’s own agency. For instance, I typically do not need to consider any evidence to conclude (correctly) 
that I will fulfil a promise of mine. My commitment to do so suffices as long as what I have promised to 




viii When just trying, one can get lucky but not really succeed. See Yaffe (2010, Ch.9) on the distinction 
between inadequate and impossible attempts. Applying this distinction, we could say that the attitude of 
‘just trying’ turns relevant actions into impossible rather than merely inadequate attempts. 
